Company Overview & Recent Developments

Babcock & Wilcox Enterprises, Inc. (NYSE: BW) is a 150+ year-old provider of energy and environmental technologies, known for industrial boilers and emissions control equipment (www.globenewswire.com). After struggling with heavy losses in prior years, B&W has been in turnaround mode – cutting debt, growing its services business, and touting new opportunities. In November 2025, the company announced a “limited notice to proceed” (LNTP) for a project to supply power to Applied Digital Corp. (APLD)’s planned AI data centers, valued at over $1.5 billion (www.globenewswire.com). This preliminary agreement was quickly followed in March 2026 by a full notice to proceed on a $2.4 billion design-build contract with a newly formed entity called Base Electron, described as an independent power producer “backed by Applied Digital” (investors.babcock.com). These announcements sent B&W’s stock soaring – rising ~198% from $3.74 (Nov 4, 2025) to $11.15 by early February 2026 (www.globenewswire.com), then jumping another 45% to $11.80 on March 4, 2026 when the $2.4B contract news hit (www.globenewswire.com). The rally continued through April, with BW reaching the high teens per share (market cap ~$2.4 billion by mid-April 2026) (www.bamsec.com). However, questions have since emerged about the legitimacy of that massive contract – leading to a short-seller report, steep volatility, and now a shareholder class action lawsuit.

Class Action Background & Allegations

On March 12, 2026, Wolfpack Research – an activist short-seller – published a report casting serious doubt on B&W’s $2.4B contract. Wolfpack revealed that Base Electron (B&W’s contract counterparty) appeared to be a new “opaque” entity affiliated with B&W’s largest shareholder, B. Riley Financial (now BRC Group) (www.tipranks.com). Specifically, Base Electron’s listed address was the same as B. Riley’s headquarters, and B. Riley’s co-CEO Bryant Riley sat on Base Electron’s board (natlawreview.com). Wolfpack noted B&W had portrayed Base Electron as a subsidiary of Applied Digital, but Applied Digital contradicted this, saying Base Electron is an independent company in which it holds only a 10% stake (www.tipranks.com). The short report suggested that B. Riley stood on both sides of the deal and that “the ultimate purpose of this deal may be to provide exit liquidity for [B. Riley]” (natlawreview.com) – implying the contract was crafted to inflate B&W’s share price so insiders could sell at a profit. Notably, B. Riley (BRC) did in fact take advantage of the price spike – selling its entire directly-held stake (~$10.4 million worth of BW shares) at around $9 in February 2026, 140% above the pre-LNTP price (www.globenewswire.com). B&W itself also raised equity amid the hype: it sold $67.5 million of stock via an ATM offering immediately after announcing the LNTP (including ~$50 million to a single institutional investor), and briefly “paused” the ATM program – only to restart it a week later (www.globenewswire.com).

Wolfpack’s revelations sent BW’s stock down ~11.6% on March 12, 2026 (natlawreview.com), and prompted shareholder lawsuits. Pomerantz LLP and several other investor law firms (e.g. Gainey McKenna, Robbins LLP, Kirby McInerney) have since filed class action complaints on behalf of investors who bought BW between Nov 5, 2025 and Mar 11, 2026 (www.prnewswire.com) (www.globenewswire.com). The suits allege that B&W misled investors by failing to disclose critical facts about the big contract and overstating its business prospects (natlawreview.com) (natlawreview.com). In particular, the complaints claim that:

– Undisclosed Related-Party Deal – B&W’s largest shareholder (BRC/B. Riley) was effectively on both sides of the power generation contract and had close ties to the counterparty (natlawreview.com). This conflict of interest was not revealed. – Questionable Economic Substance – Applied Digital didn’t actually need the vast amount of equipment/services in the contract, calling into question the true intent and economic necessity of the deal (natlawreview.com). – Revenue Recognition Doubts – Given the above, there are serious doubts whether B&W will ever realize the $2.4B in revenue from the Base Electron agreement (natlawreview.com). (Notably, if Base Electron were to default, Applied Digital can terminate its guarantee for as little as $50 million, leaving B&W with limited recourse (www.prnewswire.com).) – Overstated Prospects – By banking on this contract, B&W overstated its pipeline and 2026 outlook, making its public statements materially misleading (natlawreview.com). In fact, B&W’s backlog leapt from ~$483 million to $2.8 billion after adding the Base Electron project (www.babcock.com) – a 470% jump that may not be real if the project is illusory. – Stock Inflation & Insider Benefit – The complaint implies B&W’s executives used the hyped deal to inflate the stock for fundraising and insider sales, to the detriment of ordinary shareholders (natlawreview.com) (www.globenewswire.com).

These allegations paint a picture of potential securities fraud, now under litigation pursuant to Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 (www.prnewswire.com). Investors have until mid-June 2026 to seek lead-plaintiff status in the class action (www.prnewswire.com). The “truth” began to emerge on March 12, 2026 with Wolfpack’s report (natlawreview.com), but the full outcome (e.g. any settlement or judgment) will take time. Meanwhile, the controversy raises serious red flags about B&W’s governance and the credibility of its growth story.

Dividend Policy & Stockholder Yields

B&W has not paid any common stock dividend in recent years – unsurprising given its net losses. Common shareholders currently see no dividend yield (0%). However, the company does have a 7.75% Series A Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock (NYSE: BW PRA) on which it pays cash dividends quarterly. This preferred was issued in 2021, and B&W prides itself on a “history of paying preferred cash dividends” with the expectation to continue doing so (www.stocktitan.net). In 2025, B&W paid $14.9 million in preferred dividends (www.stocktitan.net) (about $1.94 per preferred share, which is a 7.75% annual rate on the $25 par value). These preferred payouts are a senior claim on cash flow – they must be paid (cumulatively) before any potential future common dividends. Given B&W’s financial condition, common dividends remain unlikely in the near term. Management has explicitly stated that decisions on any future common dividend will depend on a host of factors and that the Board can suspend dividends “at any time and for any reason” (www.stocktitan.net). In short, income investors have little to gain from BW common stock at present – the value is purely in potential capital appreciation. (By contrast, the publicly traded BW preferred shares offer a fixed income-like yield, and even B&W’s 6.50% senior notes due 2026 pay interest to bondholders (www.stocktitan.net). Common shareholders stand last in line for any payout.)

FFO/AFFO Metrics: Because B&W is an industrial manufacturing company, it does not report Funds From Operations (FFO/AFFO) as REITs do. A more appropriate cash flow measure is Adjusted EBITDA, which was $43.7 million for 2025 (www.babcock.com). This EBITDA is effectively the pool from which B&W must service its debt interest and preferred dividends. As discussed below, B&W’s current EBITDA just barely covers those fixed obligations – another reason why cash dividends to common stock are off the table.

Leverage, Debt Maturities & Coverage

After a series of debt refinancings and pay-downs in 2024–2025, B&W entered 2026 with a significantly deleveraged balance sheet relative to prior years. The company’s net debt was $119.7 million as of year-end 2025 (www.babcock.com), a big improvement after using equity raises and asset sales to repay borrowings. However, B&W still carries substantial absolute debt and faces near-term maturities that require attention:

– 6.50% Senior Notes ($84.8 M outstanding) – These notes come due December 31, 2026 (www.stocktitan.net) (www.stocktitan.net). Under B&W’s new credit agreement, the company must refinance or repay these 2026 notes by November 30, 2026 – otherwise the missed refinancing would trigger an accelerated default on its credit facility (www.stocktitan.net) (www.stocktitan.net). In other words, late 2026 is a hard deadline to deal with this debt. B&W has acknowledged this refinancing risk explicitly (www.stocktitan.net) (www.stocktitan.net). If it cannot refinance or extend these notes on acceptable terms, it could face liquidity trouble; in a worst case, failure to address the 2026 notes could even force a reorganization or bankruptcy proceeding (www.stocktitan.net). The positive news is that the principal has been whittled down (B&W repurchased over $100 M of these notes through exchanges and tenders) (www.stocktitan.net) (www.stocktitan.net), leaving a more manageable ~$85 M balance. Management has indicated they “plan to pay off the December 2026 bonds in a timely fashion.” (www.babcock.com) Still, investors should keep a close eye as 2026 approaches.

– 8.75% Senior Secured Notes ($129.5 M) – These second-lien notes mature June 30, 2030 (www.stocktitan.net) (www.stocktitan.net). They were issued in 2025 as part of debt exchanges (swapping out older notes at a discount) (www.stocktitan.net). The 8.75% notes are secured by substantially all B&W assets but are subordinated to the company’s credit facility and a smaller B. Riley promissory note (www.stocktitan.net) (www.stocktitan.net). Interest on these notes is payable semi-annually. With a long runway to 2030, this debt is less of an immediate concern, but it does add to B&W’s interest burden.

– Revolving Credit Facility (Axos Bank) – In January 2024, B&W entered a new asset-based Credit Agreement for up to $150 million (with a $100 M letter-of-credit sublimit) (www.stocktitan.net). This revolver matures in January 2028, provided that the 2026 notes are dealt with by late 2026 (as noted above) (www.stocktitan.net). The facility is secured and has various covenants. As of Dec 2025, B&W had only a small amount ($2.96 M) drawn on the revolver (www.stocktitan.net), but it had used ~$7.2 M of letters of credit for project bonding (www.stocktitan.net). Notably, B. Riley had originally acted as a guarantor for this credit line to help B&W secure it, but that guaranty was canceled in Feb 2026 via an amendment (www.stocktitan.net) (www.stocktitan.net). The credit facility’s interest rate is variable (SOFR + 5.25% on smaller draws, or +4.00% if borrowings exceed $100 M) (www.stocktitan.net) – implying roughly 9–10% interest cost at current SOFR levels. B&W has said it extended the Axos facility’s maturity and will use it for working capital and letters of credit needs (www.babcock.com) (www.stocktitan.net).

In addition to the above, B&W has 7.75% preferred equity ($192.5 M liquidation preference) and previously had 6.50% publicly traded baby bonds (BWNB) which are part of the 2026 notes discussed. The fixed charges from debt interest and preferred dividends are significant. In 2025, B&W’s interest expense was about $26.6 million (down from $30+ M in 2024 as debt was reduced) (www.stocktitan.net), and preferred dividends were $14.9 M (www.stocktitan.net). Together, roughly $41–42 M/year in cash outflow is needed to service debt and preferred stock. For context, B&W’s Adjusted EBITDA was $43.7 M in 2025 (www.babcock.com) – meaning the company only just covered its fixed finance costs. This thin coverage ratio (~1.05x EBITDA/Fixed charges) leaves little room for error. Fortunately, with the high-coupon 8.125% notes now redeemed and debt reduced, interest costs should drop in 2026 (the remaining 6.50% and 8.75% notes would incur ~$17 M interest annually). If B&W can grow EBITDA through new projects, coverage will improve. But if earnings falter or costs rise, the margin of safety is slim. Debt leverage, measured as Net Debt/EBITDA, is about 2.7× ($119.7M/$43.7M) – not extreme, but all contingent on hitting the anticipated earnings growth.

Financial Performance & Valuation

B&W’s operating results have been improving but are not yet robust. In 2025 the company achieved $587.7 M in revenue (up slightly from $581.0 M in 2024) and narrowed its loss from continuing operations to $32.8 M (from a $104.3 M loss in 2024) (www.babcock.com). Adjusted EBITDA jumped to $43.7 M – double the prior year – thanks to cost reductions and a strong performance in its core parts & services segment (www.babcock.com) (www.babcock.com). B&W benefited from tailwinds like increased coal power generation (driving demand for maintenance and emissions control parts) (www.babcock.com). The fourth quarter of 2025 was particularly strong, with $16.4 M in Adjusted EBITDA and a return to modest operating profit (www.babcock.com) (www.babcock.com). Management highlighted that results beat street expectations and marked significant progress in the turnaround (www.babcock.com). They also noted paying off all bonds due Feb 2026 and reducing net debt to ~$120 M, as mentioned (www.babcock.com) (www.babcock.com).

Despite these gains, B&W remains a net loss company and had an accumulated deficit for common shareholders. The investment thesis for many buyers in late 2025–2026 was the growth narrative: B&W’s backlog swelled to $2.8 B by end of 2025 (versus ~$483 M a year earlier) (www.babcock.com), largely due to the much-hyped Base Electron contract. The company also claims a “global pipeline” exceeding $12 B of potential projects, spanning clean energy, decarbonization, and traditional power (www.babcock.com). In theory, if even a fraction of this pipeline converts to revenue, B&W’s annual sales could multiply in coming years. For example, the $2.4 B AI power project alone equates to ~4× B&W’s 2025 revenue – presumably to be executed over 3–4 years. This growth optimism has led to an elevated valuation. At ~$17–18 per share in April 2026, BW’s market cap was around $2.4 B (www.bamsec.com), which is 4.1× its 2025 revenues and an even more startling ~55× its 2025 Adjusted EBITDA. Such a multiple is well above typical industrial peers – reflecting the market’s pricing-in of future earnings expansion. Essentially, investors are valuing B&W for what it could earn if major projects like Base Electron materialize successfully, rather than what it earned historically.

It’s important to note that traditional valuation metrics (P/E, P/FCF) are currently less meaningful for B&W. The company had a GAAP net loss in 2025, so it has no P/E. Free cash flow was negligible due to working capital needs and interest payments. Thus, the valuation rests on strategic value and growth potential. B&W’s management argues that the company is at an inflection point: having cleaned up legacy issues and with new partnerships (e.g. an MoU with Siemens Energy for turbines on the AI project) (investors.babcock.com), B&W aims to become a key player in the energy transition (carbon capture, hydrogen, waste-to-energy) while also capitalizing on a resurgence in thermal power demand. If they execute perfectly and the big contracts are real, earnings could eventually justify the current stock price. However, if the rosy projections don’t pan out, BW stock is vulnerable to sharp downside given its rich valuation. In fact, the stock’s volatility around the Wolfpack report – dropping from the mid-$14s to ~$13 in one day (natlawreview.com) – shows how quickly sentiment can turn if confidence in the backlog evaporates.

Key Risks & Red Flags

Investors in B&W face several significant risks and warning signs:

– Contract Authenticity & Related-Party Concerns: The $2.4 B Base Electron deal – which now represents 85%+ of B&W’s backlog – carries a cloud of doubt. The failure to disclose the role of B. Riley (B&W’s largest shareholder) in this contract is a major governance lapse (natlawreview.com). The arrangement looks like an undisclosed related-party transaction, raising concerns of self-dealing. Applied Digital’s own statements contradict B&W’s portrayal of the deal structure (www.tipranks.com), suggesting someone misrepresented facts. If the contract is not an arm’s-length, economically driven deal, B&W’s management credibility is in question. Moreover, Applied Digital’s limited 10% stake and the trivial $50 M guarantee from APLD if Base Electron defaults (www.prnewswire.com) mean this huge contract may be on shaky ground. The risk is that little to no revenue ultimately comes through if the project doesn’t secure full financing or if it was simply a vehicle to boost stock value. This is the crux of the shareholder lawsuit and is an overhang on BW’s investment thesis.

– Shareholder Litigation & Potential Liability: With multiple class action suits filed (Pomerantz, Gainey McKenna, Robbins, Kirby, etc.), B&W could face costly litigation or a settlement. While the outcome is uncertain, such cases can distract management and, if evidence of wrongdoing emerges, lead to financial penalties or more stringent oversight. It’s also possible regulators (e.g. SEC) could investigate the circumstances around the contract and stock offering, given the allegations. Any finding of securities law violations would obviously be a severe blow to the company.

– Refinancing and Liquidity Risk: As discussed, $84.8 M of notes come due in 2026, and B&W must refinance or repay them to avoid default (www.stocktitan.net). If the equity value remains high, the company could issue stock again to raise funds (as it did via ATM). But raising equity at favorable prices might be hard if the market loses confidence. Otherwise, B&W will need to tap debt markets in 2025–26 – possibly challenging for a company with B-rated credit and a controversial profile. The credit facility’s springing maturity (Nov 2026) adds pressure to get this done (www.stocktitan.net). A credit crunch or downturn by 2026 could complicate refinancing. In a stress scenario, B&W warned it “may need to reorganize, including through bankruptcy” if it cannot refinance the 2026 notes (www.stocktitan.net) – a stark risk factor to keep in mind.

– High Leverage & Thin Coverage: Although net debt is lower now, B&W’s fixed financial obligations are still high relative to earnings. Interest + preferred dividends (~$40M/yr) roughly equaled 2025 EBITDA. Until the company grows its EBITDA substantially, it’s walking a tightrope. There’s little margin for error if business slows or if projects are delayed. Any increase in borrowing costs (e.g. rising interest rates on the floating-rate credit line) or need to raise additional debt could further pressure coverage. High leverage also limits financial flexibility – B&W cannot easily make big investments without external funding.

– Execution Risk on Projects: B&W operates in an industry where large projects are often fixed-price or turnkey, exposing contractors to cost overruns, supply-chain delays, and performance guarantees. The company’s own risk disclosures highlight exposure to “contractual pricing” risks and subcontractor performance issues (www.stocktitan.net). B&W unfortunately has a checkered history here – a few years ago it suffered massive losses on European renewable energy contracts that went awry. Any repeat of past mistakes (underbidding, project mismanagement) could be devastating. The $2.4B Base Electron project, if real, is the largest in B&W’s history – executing it profitably would be a huge challenge even for a well-oiled organization, let alone one that until recently was fighting for survival. If costs on that project (or any other big job) spiral beyond estimates, B&W could face margin erosion or even losses despite higher revenue. Fixed-price contracts can turn into loss-makers if commodity prices, labor costs, or engineering problems hit, and B&W would have to absorb overruns.

– Bonding and Collateral Constraints: B&W’s business often requires posting letters of credit and surety bonds to guarantee project performance. The company relies on a $100M LC facility (now under the Axos line) and additional bonding capacity. Significant growth in project backlog will demand more bonding. There’s a risk that B&W could max out its bonding capacity or need cash collateral (tying up liquidity) if it takes on multiple large projects simultaneously. In its filings, B&W acknowledges “heavy reliance on bonding and letters of credit”, which could become a bottleneck (www.stocktitan.net). If any project were to default or face claims, the company could lose collateral or be on the hook via guarantees.

– Internal Controls & Financial Reporting: B&W’s 2025 annual report revealed that the company still had material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting as of year-end (www.stocktitan.net) (www.stocktitan.net). Specifically, management identified material weaknesses in three COSO control components (Control Environment, Control Activities, Information & Communication) and concluded that its controls were not effective (www.stocktitan.net) (www.stocktitan.net). While management noted these weaknesses did not result in a misstatement of results, they admitted there is a risk of material misstatements going undetected until the weaknesses are remediated (www.stocktitan.net) (www.stocktitan.net). In plain terms, B&W’s financial processes and oversight have not fully kept pace with its complexity. This is a red flag because weak controls heighten the risk of accounting errors or even fraud. The company is taking steps to strengthen its finance team and processes (www.stocktitan.net) (www.stocktitan.net), but until those fixes are proven effective, investors must question the reliability of B&W’s reporting. The control issues also tie back to the governance concerns – a loose control environment could have contributed to the lack of disclosure around related-party dealings.

– Insider & Sponsor Influence: B&W’s largest stakeholder, BRC (B. Riley), and its affiliates have a history of deeply influencing the company’s decisions. Bryant Riley (B. Riley’s CEO) was Chairman of B&W’s board until mid-2022 and his firm provided multiple financings that kept B&W afloat. While B. Riley’s support helped save the company, the recent episode shows a potential conflict of interest between B. Riley’s agenda and minority shareholders. B. Riley effectively traded out of a large equity position when the stock spiked (www.globenewswire.com), even as public investors were buying in on the contract news. This dynamic – an influential insider who may use aggressive tactics to drive the stock – creates additional volatility and governance risk. Minor shareholders may worry that future strategic moves (asset sales, financings, etc.) could favor the insider’s interests. Until B&W demonstrates truly independent stewardship, this shadow remains.

– Cyclical and Regulatory Risks: Outside of the specific B&W issues, the company’s business is tied to cyclical markets (power generation capex) and regulatory trends. A portion of the recent strength came from higher coal plant utilization due to energy demand (www.babcock.com). If macroeconomic or policy shifts (e.g. recession reducing power demand, or new strict carbon regulations hastening coal retirements) occur, B&W’s parts and services revenue could slump. Conversely, some of B&W’s growth initiatives (waste-to-energy, carbon capture) depend on favorable climate policies and government incentives. The policy environment is uncertain – delays or rollbacks in environmental regulations can cause customers to defer emission-control upgrades (www.stocktitan.net). B&W also faces competition and pricing pressure, and rising interest rates can deter project financing for customers. In short, it sits at a volatile intersection of the energy, industrial, and ESG cycles – adding to investment risk.

Open Questions Going Forward

1. Will the $2.4 B Base Electron project actually move forward? This is the biggest unknown. Thus far we have press releases and promises, but will we see tangible progress – e.g. financing closing, site construction, equipment orders? Applied Digital’s need for 1.2 GW of dedicated power is questionable (natlawreview.com). If the project quietly stalls or is canceled, B&W’s backlog would shrink dramatically and the growth story unravels. Investors should watch for independent confirmation that the project is real (or not).

2. What is the true nature of the B&W–B. Riley–Applied Digital relationship? Full transparency is needed on how Base Electron is funded, who controls it, and why Applied Digital distanced itself (saying it only has 10% interest) (www.tipranks.com). Was this deal essentially B. Riley financing a shell to create a contract? If so, are there legal ramifications for nondisclosure? An open question is whether regulators or exchanges will scrutinize this as a potential related-party transaction that should have been disclosed in SEC filings. Clarity here will determine trust in management.

3. How will B&W finance its growth and obligations? The company’s ambition to deliver multi-billion projects and also clear its 2026 debt hurdle will require significant capital. Can future cash flow from operations cover it, or will B&W need to issue more equity or debt? The stock ATM issuances in late 2025 raised $130 M (www.stocktitan.net), helping to pay down debt – will management tap the equity markets again, especially if the share price stays elevated? Also, with a potential need for working capital on a $2.4B job, will B&W secure down payments from the customer or is it on the hook to fund initial costs? The answer will affect liquidity and shareholder dilution.

4. Can the core business continue its momentum without the AI project? Stripping out the controversial contract, B&W’s underlying business (traditional boilermaker services, retrofits, and renewable energy equipment) is only growing modestly (2025 sales were flat vs 2024) (www.babcock.com). Parts & services did well thanks to unusual coal demand (www.babcock.com); is that sustainable or was it a one-off boost? Another question: B&W has been pursuing clean energy tech (hydrogen production, carbon capture via its BrightLoop technology, etc.) – are those nearer to commercialization or still in pilot phases? The pipeline figure of $12B suggests lots of potential leads, but investors need to see conversion of pipeline to backlog (with credible counterparties) beyond just the Base Electron deal. How B&W performs in winning and executing other projects in 2026–2027 will signal whether it has a viable long-term growth path or was over-reliant on one deal.

5. What will be the outcome of the class actions? It’s early days, but will B&W fight the allegations or seek a quick settlement? Often these shareholder suits, if meritorious, end in cash settlements paid by the company (or its D&O insurers). If evidence (emails, etc.) shows intentional deception, it could strengthen the plaintiffs’ case – potentially leading to a hefty settlement or governance reforms. Conversely, if B&W can demonstrate it technically complied with disclosure rules (for example, maybe arguing Base Electron wasn’t a formal “related party” under accounting definitions if B. Riley’s ownership is indirect), the case might narrow. The legal proceedings will likely stretch over 2026–2027. Investors should watch for any SEC inquiries or if a lead plaintiff (perhaps a large institutional investor) takes an active role, as that can up the stakes.

6. Can management restore credibility? B&W’s CEO Kenny Young and team have led the turnaround since 2019 and made progress repairing the balance sheet and operations (www.babcock.com). However, the current controversy puts a spotlight on management’s credibility. Open questions include: Will management provide more forthright updates on the Base Electron project (e.g. identify the source of funding, timeline, etc.) to ease investor concerns? How will they address the internal control weaknesses – can they get a clean bill of health on controls by next year? And more broadly, can they avoid promotional exaggeration and stick to under-promising and over-delivering? The trust of the market is something they’ll need to earn back, especially if they want a higher stock price to be sustained or to use equity for acquisitions/growth.

In summary, Babcock & Wilcox (BW) is at a crossroads. The company has dramatically swung for the fences with a transformative contract that, if real, could multiply its business – but the very reality of that contract is under scrutiny for possible self-dealing and misrepresentation (natlawreview.com). Investors should diligently monitor how these uncertainties resolve. The coming months will likely bring new information (perhaps via court filings or company disclosures) that will clarify B&W’s true prospects. Until then, BW remains a high-risk, high-reward story: its stock priced for big success, but fraught with red flags that cannot be ignored (www.stocktitan.net).

Disclosure: This report is for informational purposes only. Investors should conduct their own due diligence. The situation with B&W involves ongoing litigation and fluid developments, so the facts and assessments could change as new information emerges. Always consider risk factors as outlined above and in B&W’s SEC filings before making any investment decision.

For informational purposes only; not investment advice.